English original |
Japanese (abridge translation) |
>Top
4. Potential Newcomer Countries:
- Not surprisingly, given the general slowdown in the growth of nuclear globally, the spread of nuclear power into new countries has all but stopped over the last 25 years. Since the accident at Chernobyl, only three countries—Mexico China, and Romania—have started new nuclear power programs, and three others—Italy, Kazakhstan, and Lithuania—have closed all their reactors.a1
|
4.
新規参入国:
- 世界的には原発の普及は頭打ちだが、過去25年進まなかった新規参入国に拡がりつつある。チェルノブイリ事故以降、メキシコ、中国、ルーマニアが新規開発した。一方で、イタリー、カザフスタン、リトアニアが撤退した。
|
- Figure 10. Start-ups and Closures of National Nuclear Power Programs, 1950–2010
- Armenia closed its two reactors in 1989, following a referendum, but re-opened unit 2 in 1995.
- In 2010, the IAEA announced that 65 countries had expressed an interest in, were considering, or were actively planning for nuclear power, up from an estimate of 51countries in 2008.2 Twenty-one of these countries are in Asia and the Pacific, 21 in Africa, 12 in Europe (mostly Eastern Europe), and 11 in Latin America. A comparison of IAEA's assessments of potential newcomer countries in 2010 versus 2008 indicates that most of the rise in interest during this two-year period occurred in the least-certain category, where countries have made only supportive statements or participated in IAEA's technical cooperation programs, rather than expressing a specific plan to introduce nuclear power.3
- Although several countries have in place relatively advanced plans to build nuclear reactors, numerous examples also exist of countries or companies that have planned, started, or even completed reactors that did not become operational, such as Baatan in the Philippines, Kalkar in Germany and Zwentendorf in Austria. The pace of nuclear development and construction varies greatly by country, but there are several fundamental reasons why building nuclear power plants is not as certain or as quick as building conventional or renewable power plants. The differences occur in the areas of scale of the construction, size of plant, investment costs, grid suitability, human capacity, political stability, and project lead times.
- Investment costs.
Although the costs of producing electricity from nuclear energy are often prohibitively high, the investment cost schedule for building a nuclear plant itself can be an even greater barrier. The size and complexities of nuclear reactors make both their cost per megawatt and the upfront investment requirements far higher than for conventional and renewable alternatives. This can disproportionally affect countries that have relatively small electricity grids. Consequently, the World Bank has noted that if nuclear power were a large part of the energy mix "the high costs would require large increases in tariffs and could threaten the financial viability of the systems.”
- The economics of nuclear power are such that government subsidies are almost always required to support private sector construction of nuclear plants. Yet in many countries that wish to develop nuclear energy, limited government resources compete with pressing needs from health, education, and poverty reduction programs. Finally, it must be noted that the investment required for nuclear energy is not restricted to the power stations, but also must support a fully functioning nuclear program, a safe and secure site, supporting power generators, a large water supply, roads and transportation and waste management facilities. An analysis from the Canadian Centre of International Governance Innovation (CIGI) suggests that "reaching just a fraction of these milestones, requiring them to invest billions of dollars on infrastructure upgrades for several years, will be impossible for most SENES [emerging nuclear] states.”
|
- <左図10：新規参入国と閉鎖国、1950-2010>
- 米国は1989年に2基閉鎖したが、1995年に再開。
- 2010年のIEAEの発表では、65ヶ国が原発の新規参入に積極的であり、2008年での新規参入予定の51ヶ国を上回った。この内の21ヶ国はアジア太平洋で、アフリカは21ヶ国、主として東欧が12ヶ国、ラテンアメリカが11ヶ国である。IAEAの2010と2008との比較では、多くは具体的な計画というより参入希望を表明しただけの国が多い。
- 幾つかの国では、具体的な計画があり、一部は原子炉が完成しているもののまだ稼働に至っていない。例えば、フィリピンのBaatan、独のKalkar、オーストリアのZwentendorfである。開発の進捗度は国によってまちまち。但し原発の場合は、他の通常の建設や再生可能エネルギーの場合のように確実に進まない特徴がある。特に建設場所の規模、原発の規模、電力網の的確性、人材、政治的安定度、リードタイムなど。
- 投資コスト:
原子力発電のコストは非常に高く、資金調達はますます障壁になりつつある。原発の規模や複雑性のためMW当たりの発電コストも、先行投資部分も含め従来の発言より高くなる。特に諸規模の電力網の国にとってはその影響は不均衡に影響する。世銀は、高いコストの結果、高い関税とならざるを得ない点を指摘。
- 原発の経済としては、政府補助金が常に原発建設に関わる業界に使われてきた。多くの国では原発推進のために医療、教育、貧困対策が後回しにされてきた。原子力エネルギーへの投資は、原発の設備だけに止まらず、全般的な原子力計画、安全なサイト、発電、給水、道路輸送、廃棄物設備に及ぶ。カナダのCIGIの調査では、"原発設備はほんの一部で、何年にも亘ってインフラ整備に数十億ドルがかかる。これらは新規参入国には困難な課題である。
|
- The widespread needs for non-conventional sources and mechanisms of financing demonstrate the challenges faced in accessing large-scale financing for nuclear energy. Some governments are helping to finance the export of their technologies through the use of Export Credit Agencies (which again ties up public sector capital), and many projects—such as the build-own-operate proposal in Turkey— deploy delayed payment or leasing systems.
- Grid suitability.
Nuclear reactors tend to be large electricity generators that function most safely and efficiently when providing baseload demand (rather than following the fluctuating daily or seasonal demands). A modern reactor therefore needs to operate in a grid that has an installed capacity of at least 5 GW. According to the IAEA, as many as 17 of the 31 countries considering or planning nuclear power in 2010 did not have adequate grid size. Even if countries have adequate grid capacity, the World Bank observes that a large nuclear investments strategy "lacks flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances."
- Human capacity.
Building a new nuclear program requires adequately trained and experienced staff, both in the industry itself and in the regulatory infrastructure. While not easy in any industry, the human resource needs are further complicated by the hazardous and specialized nature of nuclear technology, in terms of its toxicity and longevity as well as its potential military applications. The CIGI notes that "many aspiring nuclear energy states struggle with poor governance, corruption, the threat of terrorism and civil unrest," suggesting that countries and companies that plan to export nuclear technologies will also need to help train qualified people. This is likely to compound staffing issues in the existing technology-producing countries. Importantly, an aspiring nuclear power country needs to first set up an independent and adequate regulatory structure before establishing a nuclear construction program—an undertaking that can take many years.
- Political stability.
Globally, civil nuclear power production has often been accompanied by, and in some cases led to, the spread of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear proliferation. Further deployment of nuclear power raises genuine concerns about the proliferation of nuclear materials, especially in politically sensitive regions. Energy expert José Goldemberg notes that of the nine developing countries that have installed nuclear reactors for electricity production (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea), five of them (China, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea) developed nuclear weapons, although South Africa later dismantled its stockpile. And Argentina and Brazil both had weapons programs, even if they did not actually manufacture them. The current case of Iran provides an even more graphic example, given the considerable concern within the international community about Iran's nuclear program and the risk of direct or indirect leakage.
- Lead times.
Rising electricity demand around the world is a primary motivation for nuclear power. Yet creating a nuclear program from scratch is a lengthy business. The IAEA estimates that starting a new construction program in a country without experience can take between 11 and 20 years, and the French Safety Authorities assume a minimum of 15 years to set up an appropriate framework.11 Given the uncertainty of electricity demand forecasts, matching these with the long lead times required for nuclear development is a potentially high-risk venture.
|
- 原発の場合は、従来型のやり方とは異なる大規模資金計画が必要。一部の国では、技術輸出に公的な輸出信用銀行によるBOOT方式 (Build-Own-Operate-Transfer)、延払方式、リース方式を供与。
- 電力網:
原発の場合は、大容量のベースロード (稼働変動や季節変動しない)が基本。5GWでの電力網が必要で、17ヶ国では電力網が不十分。
- 人材能力:
原発には、産業界も規制当局にも経験豊かな熟練技術者が必要。原子力特有の毒性、長期の経験、軍の経験が必要。さらにガバナンス、汚職防止、テロ対策、民間不安の経験が必要で、輸出の場合はこれらの人材育成も必要。特に原発開発に意欲的な国々は、原発計画に先行してまず独立した適切な規制当局が必要。
- 政治的安定性:
世界的な民間の原子力発電には、核拡散の恐れがある。原発の開発にともない政治的にセンシティブな核物質の拡散の危惧がある。現在原発開発中の9ヶ国 (アルゼンチン、ブラジル、中、印、イラン、メキシコ、パキスタン、南ア、北朝鮮)の内、５ヶ国 (中、印、パキスタン、南ア、北朝鮮)は核兵器を開発した。但し南アは核兵器を放棄した。アルゼンチンとブラジルは核兵器開発の計画はあるものの実際には製造していない。イランの場合はさらに顕著な例で、国際社会はイランの核開発計画とその直接間接の拡散を危惧している。
- リードタイム:
世界では電力需要が原発開発の主な動機だが、ゼロからの開発には長期間かかる。IAEAによれば未経験の国にとっては、11-20年が、仏当局によればの15年の期間がかかるとしている。これら長期間の電力需要の不確実性を加味すると原発開発はハイリスクの事業である。
|
- Power Plants Under Construction
- Iran is the only country that is currently building nuclear power plants that does not already produce nuclear energy. Yet Iran's nuclear development has hit numerous delays, and if the largely completed Bushehr reactor becomes operational in 2011, it would mark the end of a 36-year construction program. Although grid connection was expected in February 2011, new technical problems during commissioning make the final operational date again uncertain. The reactor builder, Russia's Rosatom, reportedly attributes the most recent delay to problems with one of the coolant pumps, which were originally supplied in the 1970s. Fragments have entered the primary coolant, requiring removal of the fuel.
- The plant's long construction history may have affected safety standards as well. The original reactors, ordered by the Shah in 1974, were designed and slated to be built by German electronics giant Siemens. Following the Islamic revolution, however, payments were halted and construction was suspended in 1979. At the time, two reactors were under construction, with unit 1 said to be around 85 % complete and unit 2 to be 50 % complete.
- Further problems were inflicted during the Iran-Iraq War, when attacks from aircraft partially damaged both reactors. Iraqi warplanes first struck the Bushehr reactor on 24 March 1984, then two more air strikes took place in 1985, one in 1986, two in 1987, and a final raid in 1988. One reactor was severely damaged, with the structure sealed and the containment dome covered in sheet metal, with some reports suggesting that "the entire core area of both reactors" was destroyed.
- After the war, Iran attempted to complete the reactor using other Western suppliers. But pressure, particularly from the United States, blocked these developments, and Iran began negotiations with Russia in 1991. This led to a deal in 1994 for the completion of unit 1 as a VVER 1000 (a 1,000 MW light water reactor), and eventually to an agreement for the supply of fresh nuclear fuel and the return of spent fuel to Russia. Loading of the fuel started in October 2010.
- Controversy and international concern regarding the reactor complex and especially Iran's uranium enrichment project remain, which has led to various speculations on the measures being used to restrict and halt the start up of the units. The most prominent of these was a reported attack on the facility's computer system using the computer worm Stuxnet, with a senior Iranian official saying that it had caused harm to the reactor. Numerous Internet sites also report that unmanned aircraft (drones) crashed into the reactor in August 2010.
|
-
建設中の原発:
- イランは、原子力エネルギーを開発してきたが、原発を開発してこなかった唯一の国はイランだけ。イランの開発は何度も遅延してきた。そのBushehr原発は36年かかって2011年にほぼ完成したが、新たな問題が起こりさらに完成が遅れる見通し。主建設者であるロシアのRosatomによれば、最近の問題は1970年代に供給された冷却ポンプにあるという。破片が主冷却器に混入し、燃料の除去が必要。
- 長い建設期間中には安全基準も影響した。1974年にシャーによる最初の原発は独のジーメンスが建設した。イスラム革命の後、代金支払が滞納し、1979に建設が中断した。当時２基が建設中だったが、その１基は85%、２基目は50%が完成していた。
- その後イランイラク戦争で、航空機爆撃にこの２基とも被弾した。最初の被弾は1984.3.24に、引き続き1985、1986、1987、1988年と被弾した。１基は大破し構造物は金属板で封印されたが、2基の中心部分は破壊されたという。
- 戦争後、イランは西欧の供給者によって完成させようとしたが米国の反対圧力で頓挫し、1991年にロシアの協力を仰いだ。その結果1994に１基はVVER-1000（1GW軽水炉)が完成し、核燃料の供給と使用済燃料の返却の契約をロシアと結んだ。燃料の装填は2010.10に開始された。
- 特にイランのウラン濃縮計画には国際的な関心が集まっている。この設備のコンピュータシステムは、コンピュータウイルスStuxnetの攻撃を受けた。また2010.8には無人飛行機による原子炉への衝突もネット上で報じられた。
|
- Contracts Signed
- Like Iran, Turkey has a long history of attempting to build a nuclear power program, starting in the early 1970s. In 1996, a call for tender was launched for the construction of 2 GW of nuclear capacity at the Akkuyu site along the eastern Mediterranean, and several international bids were received, including from Westinghouse, AECL, Framatome, and Siemens. In 2000, however, the bid was abandoned.15 In 2006, the government revised the nuclear initiative and announced plans for up to 4.5 GW of capacity at Akkuyu and at the Black Sea site of Sinop. The plans met with massive local protests.
- The following year, Turkey approved a bill introducing new laws on construction and operation of nuclear power plants, which led to a revised tender process in March 2008 for the Akkuyu plant. Only one bid was received jointly from Atomstroyexport and Inter RAO (both from Russia) and Park Teknik (Turkey) for an AES-2006 power plant with four 1200 MW reactors. In May 2010, Russian and Turkish heads of state signed an intergovernmental agreement for Rosatom to build, own, and operate the Akkuyu plant with four 1200 MW AES-2006 units—a $20 billion project. The reactors are expected to enter service at yearly intervals in the period 2018–21.1
- In March 2010, Turkey also signed an agreement with Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco) to prepare a bid for the Sinop plant. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement because of "differences in issues including electricity sales price." Negotiations switched to Toshiba, with support of the Japanese government, and in December 2010 the parties signed an agreement to prepare a bid for development. a All dollar amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars unless indicated otherwise.
- The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has the most advanced new nuclear development plans in the Middle East. In April 2008, the UAE published a nuclear energy policy that stated that nuclear power was a proven, environmentally promising and commercially competitive option that "could make a significant base-load contribution to the UAE's economy and future energy security." The policy proposed installing up to 20 GW of nuclear energy capacity, including 5 GW by 2020. This would require the operation of four reactors, two between Abu Dhabi city and Ruwais, one at Al Fujayrah, and possibly one at As Sila.
- A joint-venture approach, similar to that developed for the water and conventional power utilities, was proposed in which the government retains a 60 % share and a private company a 40 % share. A call for bids in 2009 resulted in nine expressions of interest and the short listing of three companies: AREVA (France) with GDF-SUEZ, EDF, and Total, proposing EPRs; GE-Hitachi (USJapan), proposing ABWRs; and a South Korean consortium, proposing APR–1400 PWRs. In December 2009, the Korean consortium was awarded the $20 billion contract for the construction and first fuel loads of four reactors, reportedly because the consortium could demonstrate the highest capacity factors, lowest construction costs, and shortest construction times.
- The public in the UAE has raised almost no objection to the nuclear energy policy, which has been sold as a way to relieve pressure on the country's fossil fuel resources, increase the security of electrical power supply, create employment and a high-tech industry, and reduce carbon emissions. In July 2010, a site-preparation license and a limited construction license were granted for four reactors at a single site at Braka, along the coast 53 kilometers from Ruwais. The application is based substantially on the safety analysis done for South Korea’s Shin–Kori units 3 and 4, the "reference plan" for the UAE's new build program. A tentative schedule published in late December 2010 projects that Braka-1 will start commercial operation in 2017 and unit 2 in 2018. In March 2011 a ground breaking ceremony was held to mark the start of construction.
|
- 契約調印:
- イラン同様に、トルコでも長い原発計画が1970年代より開始されてきた。東地中海のAkkuyuでの原発2GWの国際入札が行われ、Westinghouse, AECL, Fraatome, Siemensが参加。2000年にはこの入札は中止され、トルコ政府は改めて4.5GWの原発を黒海側に発表したが、現地の反対が起きている。
- 2008には法改正して改めて2008にAkkuyu原発計画を発表。 トルコとロシアの合弁でAES-2006原発４基1200MWの入札を実施。2010.5に両国政府が200億ドルの案件に調印。2019-21年に完成予定。
- 2010.3にトルコは韓国電力(Kepco)とSinop原発の入札に調印。但し、両者は電力料金を巡り合意に至らず。その後、日本政府の支援を得て東芝と2010.12に開発の米国ドル建て調印。
- UAEは、2008.4に中東での新たな原発計画を立案。原発は環境的にも商業的にも実証されており、UAE経済の将来のエネルギーのベースロードになると公表。20GWの原発の計画で、当面2020年までに5GWを建設するとした。これは４基の原発からなり、Abu DhabiとRuwaisの間に2基、Al Fujayrahに１基、As Silaに1基の計画。
- これは、淡水化プラントや従来の発電所と同様に合弁方式で、60%現地政府、40%私企業で行う。2009年の入札では9社が応札し、ショートリストに３社が残った。仏のAREVAグループ、GE/日立連合、韓国コンソーシアムである。2009.12に、韓国コンソーシアムが200億ドルで受注した。これは4基の原発＋初期燃料の費用を含む。韓国勢の提案は稼働率が最高、建設費が最低、建設期間が最短であった。
- UAEの大衆は原発政策にほとんど反対はなく、石油依存からの脱出、電力供給の安定、CO2削減を評価。2010.7には、立地許可および限定的に建設許可がRuwaisの53km離れたBrakaのサイトが決まった。韓国からはは、Shin-Kori3-4号機での安全審査分析を、UAEの新原発の参考資料として提出。2010.12に提出された仮計画では、Braka-1基は2017年に、2基目は2018に商用運転開始予定。2011.3に建設着工のセレモニーが行われた。
|
- Decisions Announced by Industry and Governments
In mid-2006, the government of Belarus approved a plan for construction of a nuclear power plant in the Mogilev region in the country's east. Expressions of interest were sought from international companies, and, not surprisingly given economic and political ties, a bid from Russia's Atomstroyexport was taken forward. Under a financing agreement, Russia will provide a $9 billion loan. The two countries will reportedly sign an agreement on plant construction in spring 2011, with construction possibly starting that September. Operation of the first unit is envisaged for 2016 and the second in 2018, a highly unlikely scenario. Meanwhile, the Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) in a Trans-boundary Context has notified Belarus about violations of its rules and major inconsistencies in the EIA documentation.
- In Egypt, the government's Nuclear Power Plants Authority was established in the mid-1970s, and plans were developed for 10 reactors by the end of the century. Despite discussions with Chinese, French, German, and Russian suppliers, little specific development occurred for several decades. In October 2006, the Minister for Energy announced that a 1,000 MW reactor would be built, but this was later expanded to four reactors by 2025, with the first one coming on line in 2019. In early 2010, a legal framework was adopted to regulate and establish nuclear facilities; however, an international bidding process for the construction was postponed indefinitely in February 2011 due to the political situation.
- Since the mid-1970s, Indonesia has discussed and brought forward plans to develop nuclear power, releasing its first study on the introduction of nuclear power, supported by the Italian government, in 1976. The analysis was updated in the mid-1980s with help from the IAEA, the United States, France, and Italy. Numerous discussions took place over the following decade, and by 1997 a Nuclear Energy Law was adopted that gave guidance on commercial construction, operation, and decommissioning. A decade later, the 2007 Law on National Long-Term Development Planning for 2005–25 stipulated that between 2015 and 2019, four units should be completed with an installed capacity of 6GW. Discussions with nuclear vendors have included the possibility of using Russian floating reactors but appear to be dominated by Japanese and South Korean companies; however, neither financing nor detailed planning appear to be in place.
- All of Italy's nuclear power plants were closed following a post-Chernobyl referendum in 1987, but this has not stopped the country's largest electricity utility, ENEL, from buying into nuclear power in other countries, including France, Slovakia, and Spain. In May 2008, the government introduced a package of nuclear legislation that included measures to set up a national nuclear research and development entity, to expedite licensing of new reactors at existing nuclear power plant sites, and to facilitate licensing of new reactor sites. ENEL and EDF have subsequently stated that they intend to build four EPR reactors by 2020. In January 2011, however, the Constitutional Court ruled that Italy could hold a referendum on the planned reintroduction of nuclear power, as proposed by an opposition party. The question to be posed in the referendum, scheduled for mid-2011, is whether voters want to cancel some of the legislative and regulatory measures that have been taken by the government over three years. New-build projects would have to overcome significant popular opposition.
- To date, Jordan has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with 12 countries. In February 2011, the country's energy minister announced that the Atomic Energy Commission had preselected designs from AECL of Canada, Atomstroyexport of Russia, and a joint venture between AREVA and Mitsubishi—called Atmea—for the country's first nuclear reactor, located at Majdal. According to the schedule, the preferred bidder would be chosen by September 2011 and the final decision made by the end of the year. Jordan is also seeking foreign corporations to both operate and invest in the nuclear project and has lined up four entities, GDFSUEZ, Rosatom, Datange International Power, and Kansai.27 Building is expected to start on the 750-1100 MW plant in 2013 for operation by 2020, and a second for operation by 2025.
- Poland planned the development of a series of nuclear power stations in the 1980s and started construction of two VVER 1000/320 reactors in Zarnowiec on the Baltic coast, but both construction and plans were halted following the Chernobyl accident. In 2008, however, Poland announced that it was going to re-enter the nuclear arena. In November 2010, the government adopted the Ministry of Economy's Nuclear Energy Program, which was submitted to a Strategic Environmental Assessment that is expected to take most of 2011. Poland wants to build 6 GW of nuclear power with the first bloc starting up by 2020, although the country has signaled previously that it may take until 2022.
- In its Power Development Plan for 2010–30, approved in 2010, Thailand proposes the construction of 5 GW of nuclear capacity. Currently, five locations are being considered as part of a feasibility study that was supposed to be completed by the end of 2010 but has now been delayed. This may be due in part to local opposition to proposed plant sitings, which reportedly have reduced the number of possible locations to two or three areas. Consultancy firm Wood Mackenzie estimates that Thailand will not even be able to introduce a nuclear safety regulatory framework until 2026. Other key problems are the lack of finances and skilled personal.
- In October 2010, Vietnam signed an intergovernmental agreement with Russia's Atomstroyexport to build the Ninh Thuan 1 nuclear power plant, using 1200 MW reactors. Construction is slated to begin in 2014, and the turnkey project will be owned and operated by the state utility Electricity of Vietnam (EVN), with operations beginning in 2020. Rosatom has confirmed that Russia's Ministry of Finance is prepared to finance at least 85 percent of this first plant, and that Russia will supply the new fuel and take back used fuel for the life of the plant. The total cost is expected to near $10 billion. Vietnam has also signed an intergovernmental agreement with Japan for the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Ninh Thuan province, with its two reactors to come-on line in 2024–25. The agreement calls for assistance in conducting feasibility studies for the project, low-interest and preferential loans for the project, the use of the most advanced technology with the highest safety standards, technology transfer and training of human resources, and cooperation in the waste treatment and stable supply of materials for the whole life of the project. Both of Vietnam's proposed nuclear projects are likely to seriously slip because of a lack of finances and skilled staff.
- > Conti
nued:
5. Nuclear Economics (1):
|
- 産業界および政府からの決定発表:
- ベラルーシは2006年半ばに東部のMogilevでの原発計画を発表。ロシアのAtomstroyexportも入札に参加の意向。ロシアは90億ドルの資金を供与。2011年春に両国は調印し、今秋から建設開始の予定。1基は2016年、2基目は2018年の予定だが実現は難しい。一方でEspooの環境評価では環境法令と矛盾する評価もなされている。
- エジプトでは、1970年代から原子力庁が設立され、20世紀末までに10基を開発予定だった。中、仏、独、ロシアと交渉してきたが、数十年経過しても進展がない。2006.10に、エネルギー省は1000MWの原発計画は発表し、後で2025年までに4基に拡張し、１基目を2019までに建設するとした。法的整備も採択されたものの、政治情勢の理由で、2011.2には国際入札は無期限延期となった。
- インドネシアは1970年代より原発計画を立案し、1976年に伊の支援を得て研究してきた。検討結果は1980年代半ばにIEAEや米、仏、伊の支援を得て修正された。1997年に原子力エネルギー法が採択され商用炉の建設、運用、廃炉の基準が決まった。10年後の2007年に、2005-25の国家長期開発計画が採択され、2015-19の間に4基の原発6GWの建設計画が発表された。ベンダーはロシア、日、韓の見込みだが、建設計画および資金調達についてはまだ具体化していない。
- イタリーの原発は1987年のチェルノブイリ事故以降、一時中断しているが、国内最大の電力会社ENELが、仏、スロバキア、スペインなど外国の原発の株主となることまで禁止はしていない。2008.5に、伊政府は新たな原発計画のR&Dを設立した。ENELやEDFは2020年までに新型のEPR炉の建設を意図している。しかし2011.1に憲法裁判所は原発再開には2011半ばに国民投票を行い、今後３カ年に亘り原発に関する立法の是非を問うべきと判断した。新規プロジェクトは国民の反対を克服する必要がある。
- ヨルダンは、12ヶ国と原子力協力協定を締結した。2011.2に原子力委員会はカナダAECL、ロシアのAtomstroyexport、AREVA/三菱連合 (Atmea)でヨルダン初のMajdal原発を推進することになった。入札は2011.9に行われ、年末に確定予定。ヨルダンは外国勢に、原発の運用と投資を呼びかけており、2013に750-100 MWを着手し、第1期は2020年に、第2期は2025年の稼働を目指し、合計4基を開発する。
- ポーランドは1980年代に原発計画を策定し、2基のVVER 1000/320をバルト海沿岸のZarnowiecに建設開始したが、チェルノブイリ事故の後中断した。 2008年にポーランド政府は工事再開を発表した。2010.11に経済省の原子力エネルギー計画を発表し、環境評価の提出を行った。ポーランドは2020年までに計6基の原発を開始を要望したが、2022年まで延期となった。
- タイは、2010-30までの電力開発計画を2010年に承認し、5GWの原発の建設を進めることになった。現在５カ所で調査実施され2010末に完了予定だったが現在遅延している。これは立地での反対運動と立地箇所が２-3に減ったことによる。コンサルタントであるWood Mackenzieの試算では、2026年までにタイは原子力安全基準の導入ができない可能性がある。さらに親近不足うや熟練技術者不足が挙げられる。
- ベトナムは、2010.10には、ロシアと政府間協定を調印し、AtomstroyexportとNinh Thuan1原発1200MWの開発を決定。建設は2014開始し、2020年にベトナム電力EVNが稼働予定。ロシアは第一基に必要な資金の85%を融資し、使用済燃料を回収する。全コストは約100億ドル。ベトナムは同時に日本と政府間協定を結び、2024-25に稼働するNinh Thuan州の2基目の原発開発に調印。この契約には経済性調査の実施、低金利融資、安全度の高い最新技術、技術威厳および人材育成、廃棄物処理の協力、全期間に亘っての燃料の安定供給を含む。この２つの計画は資金および熟練技術者不足で期間延長となる可能性がある。
- > つづく:
|
